T he challenge for NASA's Systems Analysis Integrated Discipline Team (SAIDT) is to develop a new organization design capable of performing complex modeling and analysis tasks, using team members at various NASA centers. The focus is on: (1) design as a process, (2) the effect of design tools on the process as well as alternative designs, (3) the fit between the tools and their fit with the organization, (4) the effect of an ongoing agencywide transformation, and (5) implications for organizational contingency theory.
Introduction
NASA faces the challenge of managing and coordinating distributed technical experts developing the next generation of space exploration systems. We report on the efforts of NASA managers designing the Systems Analysis Integrated Discipline Team (SAIDT), one of several teams executing NASA's Vision for Space Exploration (2004) . The larger organization and environment constrained the design, and the design needed to coordinate SAIDT work tasks involving personnel from geographically distributed centers. The design process demonstrated new ways of organizing and conducting business after the shuttle Columbia disaster. Thus, not only the resulting design, but the process was pushing the agenda for change within NASA.
As such, this paper is as concerned with the process of discovery and refinement , Weick 1977 , Pettigrew 1987 , Greenwood and Hinings 1988 as with the design product. The iterative process is also shaped and constrained by the design tools. It improves the design by developing choices. Misfits are identified and fixed. Designers also review progress made and problems encountered, and make midcourse adjustments.
Three tools used in this study shaped the questions considered, the data available, and the possible answers. The Design Structure Matrix (DSM) (Steward 1981) provided a static look at interdependencies between organizational units and project tasks. OrgCon ™ is an expert system program that assessed the fit between multiple organizational and environmental contingencies for the organization as a whole (Burton and Obel 2004) . SimVision ™ gave a "bottoms-up" view of task flows, actors, and interdependencies to predict time, cost, and quality. These tools fit the culture of the organization. NASA relies heavily on engineering and computational techniques, especially simulations. Simulating the human systems fostered initial acceptance by the involved project managers. This paper begins with some background on NASA, then discusses the process followed in developing the new organization designs. The first phase of analysis formed integrated engineering teams using the DSM approach. The second phase relied on OrgCon to develop a baseline model for the SAIDT. The final phase explored alternatives and assessed the robustness of the baseline design, using both SimVision and OrgCon. This paper concludes by discussing implications for organization theory.
The NASA Organization Design Challenge
Understanding NASA's contextual frame of reference is essential to an understanding of how the organization design process unfolded (Van de Ven 1992) . Like all organizations, NASA's internal and external contexts both enable and constrain the process of generating alternatives and evaluating potential designs (Pettigrew 1992) . The United States Vision for Space Exploration (2004) presented NASA with an overall mission that included a return to the Moon followed by human exploration of Mars and beyond. Mindful of the difficulty of managing complex, large-scale technical projects, NASA managers recognized that organization design, and the ability to evolve the design over a long duration program would be critical to success. Thus, NASA managers sought better methods to model and analyze the characteristics and performance of their units, including their structure, cost, internal and external interactions (with industry partners, for example), and overall effectiveness.
NASA's Exploration Program-Constellation
Systems The SAIDT is one component of Project Constellation. Considered in its entirety, Constellation Systems refers to the complete set of systems required for human and human/robotic exploration activities on the Moon, Mars, and beyond.
The components of Constellation are being developed in a modular fashion. The large number and complexity of the design options for the components themselves is compounded by the additional need for these components to work together. For example, it is critically important that the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), its launch vehicle, the lunar lander, and other equipment, which share functional interfaces with the CEV, all share a robust, interoperable software architecture. This architecture must be "open" in the sense that it be structured to gracefully accept the inevitable upgrades in software applications that will be produced over a 20-year program life cycle.
The integration of the engineering systems is paralleled by the required integration of the organizational units building the components. The staff responsible for developing software applications reside in multiple, geographically distributed organizations that must share similarly open interfaces. The boundaries that must be spanned across these interfaces include not only geographical boundaries, but also government-industry boundaries and multiple, often-competing contractors within industry.
The resulting organizational design challenge is to create a high-performing organization characterized by wide-open communication across the many interfaces, strong motivation to cooperate in spite of competing profit motives, and strong goal orientation to ensure astronaut safety and mission success.
The Ongoing NASA Transformation
Even before the Vision for Space Exploration was announced, NASA had begun an agencywide effort to address cultural and organizational deficiencies that contributed to the loss of 2 space shuttles and 14 astronauts over 14 years. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report concluded that deficiencies in management and organization were a main contributor to the accident:
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program's history and culture, including resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures and lack of an agreed national vision for human spaceflight. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision making processes that operated outside the organization's rules. (CAIB Report 2003, Vol. I, p. 177) Because organizational causes contributed to the Challenger and Columbia accidents, new organization designs at NASA must facilitate quality decision making (Starbuck and Milliken 1988) . The design must also promote the "One NASA" initiative, which aims to build processes, tools, and capabilities for better communication and collaboration among the 10 NASA field centers.
NASA's organizational structure was reorganized in January 2004 to realign internal operations and decisionmaking authority with the new exploration agenda. The new structure was based on four "mission directorates"-Exploration Systems, Space Operations, Science, and Aeronautics Research-and a handful of headquarters support functions. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate is responsible for Constellation, yet the personnel who will staff Constellation projects work in 10 field centers managed by the other 3 mission directorates. Thus the organization structure is a large matrix between projects (managed by Exploration Systems) and functional areas (overseen by Space Operations, Science, and Aeronautics Research).
Formulating the Integrated Discipline
Teams (IDTs) 
Constellation Integrated Discipline Team
Formulation Study Because the Project Constellation effort spans all of NASA's 10 field centers as well as headquarters, Constellation senior managers instructed the ODT to conduct an organization design study that would establish an organization capable of accessing the technical staff who possess the needed skills and disciplines at the field centers. The ODT, with expert input from the 10 field centers, developed a teaming structure aligned around technical disciplines called Integrated Discipline Teams (IDTs).
The methodology relied heavily on interviews, consensus discussions and iterative improvements using matrices developed with the DSM (Steward 1981) . This tool allows for graphical representation of interfaces and information flows between actors in an organization, hardware or software elements in a complex system, or tasks in a program or project, including tasks that are iterative or require feedback. Although the DSM methodology is static and lower in fidelity than other tools (such as SimVision), its generality and ease of use meant that it was well suited to aid in the initial design of the integrated discipline teams. Because the IDTs were formed from technical personnel in the field centers working on aspects of Constellation that shared interdependencies, the DSM methodology seemed appropriate.
Conducting the IDT Analysis
The study team decided to group personnel on the basis of skills/disciplines rather than products because the Constellation Systems mission had just been created and no products had been identified. The IDTs were formed by analyzing critical skill interactions (see Figure 1 ) using the DSM analysis approach. After individually assessing the degree of interaction and meeting to discuss those areas with high levels of disagreement between team members, the team clustered the high interaction items along the diagonal of the matrix. The clustered items represent skills with high levels of interaction, which provided the logic for the IDTs.
IDT Formulation Study Conclusion
Senior Constellation managers supported this process, and implemented the recommended 14 IDTs with only minor changes (see Figure 2 ). These teams provided Constellation Systems with access to 200 full-time equivalent personnel across 10 field centers to initiate the complex Constellation Systems design process.
The ODT leader then transitioned to lead one particular IDT, the SAIDT. In addition, the ODT was assigned to the SAIDT as a subteam to transition the Program/ Organization Modeling and Simulation (POMS) initiative without loss of momentum.
Designing the SAIDT
In Phase 2, the design team sought to find an acceptable organizational design for the Constellation SAIDT. The SAIDT was chartered to perform technical studies and systems analysis tasks in support of the design, development, test, and evaluation of Constellation Systems. The task for the ODT was to design a cohesive team that would draw on the technical expertise of personnel from all 14 IDTs staffed from up to 9 NASA centers. This required the SAIDT chairperson and his core leadership team to identify the personnel requirements, estimate the resources required for the team, and scope the roles and responsibilities of individual team members. To facilitate the organization design process for SAIDT, the ODT needed to develop an understanding of the internal division of work and coordination mechanisms, as well as their likelihood of meeting project goals (time, resources required, and quality). These were design aspects at a level of detail that the DSM analysis could not address.
SAIDT Design Study Challenge
The first of three sets of organization design questions related to the best way to draw on the expertise located in geographically distributed field centers. The second set dealt with coordination mechanisms. The third set related to performance. How likely would the SAIDT be able to meet schedule, cost, and quality goals? In addition to these questions, the SAIDT chairperson set forth requirements for the organization. It needed to be flexible, because each study task would require a team to be formed, analysis done, and results disseminated quickly (typically two to four months). And it needed to have clear lines of responsibility, as the CAIB report (2003) had identified unrealistic goals, schedule pressures, and a lack of clear delegation of roles and responsibilities as indirect causes of the Columbia accident.
Developing the SAIDT Baseline Model
The first concern of the ODT related to how virtual the SAIDT should be. The first scenario, termed the Core Team Option, relied on moderately skilled personnel colocated at only one or two NASA centers, and permanently assigned to the SAIDT on at least an annual basis. The advantage of easier face-to-face coordination would be offset by the disadvantage of using permanently assigned staff who might not be as technically skilled as others and who might only be available on a part-time basis because of other priority assignments. The study personnel would also include people who had not worked together in the past. The alternative design was termed the Distributed Matrix Team Option. Here, a number of highly skilled staff drawn from many of the NASA field centers would coordinate via frequent, virtual meetings using teleconferences and webcasts. The ODT wanted to consider whether there was a limitation to the number of participating centers such that efficiency (and/or other measures of organizational performance) decreases as the number of participants increases.
During this phase of work, the ODT relied primarily on OrgCon, an expert system informed by multicontingency theory (Baligh et al. 1996, Burton and Obel 2004) . In an OrgCon analysis, users input information on the organization's environment and organizational design choices and OrgCon provides a top-down assessment of the fits and misfits between contingencies such as the organization's strategy, structure, incentives, management style, climate, and environment.
The ODT believed that most NASA managers, faced with the need to design a new project team, would rely on their past experience and intuition to develop an organization design. They thought that tools such as OrgCon and SimVision (described in §5) could supplement intuition with tools that allowed managers to evaluate alternative organization designs and to develop insight into potential problem areas before the project began.
The process of developing the baseline OrgCon model actually answered this question before the simulation itself was run. That is, the process of providing inputs to the OrgCon model gave the team a different view of the organizational design than they had up to this point. The model development process relied on interviewing the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the SAIDT to answer the roughly 60 input questions for the OrgCon model dealing with the organization's strategy, structure, and environment (see Table 1 ). The managers were first interviewed individually, then interviewed together to develop a consensus set of answers. This process helped create a common view of the SAIDT organization design and operating challenges.
After discussing these options and developing the model inputs, the ODT decided that, in reality, the Core Team and Distributed Matrix Team were not equally plausible discrete options, given the NASA context. For instance, the SAIDT chairperson recognized that most study tasks would be temporary, somewhat foreseeable, relatively high-priority efforts conducted in finite cycles of two to four months' duration. In all likelihood, he would have to negotiate with functional line managers at the field centers to request staff with the requisite skills and experience be assigned to his study tasks, particularly because the skills needed would vary from study to study, and from cycle to cycle. Thus the Core Team Option in which the SAIDT would be populated with permanently assigned staff with a finite skill set (7) Centralization (10) Medium (cf. 100%)
Formalization (7) Medium (cf. 100%)
Incentives (1) Group-based results (cf. 100%)
Size (1) Medium size (cf. 100%)
Leadership and Entrepreneurial (cf. 93%) management style (6) Organizational climate (7) Developmental ( was not a realistic option. In addition, a team structure was needed in which a small leadership team could handle the daily team management, planning, and technical oversight to maximize team agility and minimize broader staff resource utilization until needed to execute specific study tasks.
A more plausible option was a type of matrix where the study task leads receive direction from the SAIDT Planning Team managers (see Figure 3) . In this case, the study task leads were drawn from seven of the supporting NASA field centers and direct their assigned study team members, also from the various centers. The study team members then answer to the study task leads for the duration of the study only, as assigned by their line organization supervisors based on skills and experience. This group loosely constitutes the Analysis Team of the SAIDT, as shown in Figure 3 . The baseline SAIDT was comprised of about 30-40 people, many working part time (resulting in about 20 full-time equivalents). The staff were drawn from seven different NASA centers, with approximately half of the staff from the two lead SAIDT centers (Langley and Johnson). There were typically two to three line organizations from which Analysis Team members were drawn from within each center as well. The SAIDT Planning Team, which consisted of a core group of about 10 staff, provided direction on analysis study task definition and priorities, and the Analysis Team members executed the individual study tasks, with each study led by a task manager who was delegated responsibility from the team chairperson to execute the study within the assigned resources and required schedule.
SAIDT Baseline Model Results
The ODT then modeled the baseline SAIDT organization design option in OrgCon. OrgCon considers whether any of the environmental, organizational, and strategic contingencies are misfit with each other. The SAIDT baseline organization design presented almost no misfits or unbalanced situations among the contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, climate, strategy, and the organization structure. The only misfit suggested was based on the organization having a developmental climate (see Table 2 ), which is misfit with a high degree of organizational complexity. OrgCon suggests that a developmental climate demands not to be restricted by a rigid hierarchy and job specialization, so that everyone can react quickly to new situations (Burton and Obel 2004) . However, the SAIDT organization was almost equally likely to have a group climate as a developmental climate. Because a group climate is not a misfit with high complexity, the proposed SAIDT organization design was predicted to be functional and reasonable. This demonstrates that it is in alignment from an organization theory standpoint, but not that it is the only or the ideal alternative. When the organization design is implemented, the climate must be an ongoing concern of the management to counter the rigidity of the structure and not let the job specialization hinder its operations, which will become a major part of the leader's job. In summary, the second phase of this study formed the baseline organization design for the SAIDT. From a NASA perspective, this design was feasible and reasonable. From a contingency theory perspective, it presented only one possible misfit, although this was not definitive. The next phase of this study focused on the next tier of greater detail, working within the established macrostructure to develop the more microlevel, task-oriented design to assess the performance of the microdesign, and to develop alternative task designs within the overall macrostructure.
Refining the SAIDT Organization Design

SAIDT Refinement Study
The ODT next analyzed the baseline model using SimVision, a system modeling, project design, and discrete event simulation tool (see Levitt et al. 1994 Levitt et al. , 1999 for more on the development of the Virtual Design Team, the precursor to SimVision). In a SimVision analysis, users input information on project parameters, task flow and task features, and individual actor characteristics. The model then allows quantitative analysis of largely qualitative phenomena to develop an organization that has predictable capabilities and known limits. The ODT developed a baseline organization structure, a corresponding schedule of tasks and milestones, and a set of program risk factors. Similar to the OrgCon process, the ODT held review meetings with SAIDT members to develop and validate the baseline microlevel SAIDT SimVision models.
Case 1: The SAIDT Baseline Model
The SAIDT Baseline Model combined elements of a functional, a simple, and a matrix organization. The initial baseline model (Case 0) captured actors, tasks, and milestones for the SAIDT project (see Table 3 for details on the model settings). The SAIDT project required a cyclical execution of a planned set of complementary Centralization is based on where decision-making authority resides.
Formalization affects the likelihood of formal or informal communication.
Matrix strength models the "connectedness" of an organization by setting the probability that workers will attend to exchanges of information.
engineering analyses and trade studies to characterize the capability and functionality of the Constellation Systems. The Case 0 model is essentially a critical path method version of the project that does not include the effects of "hidden work" such as coordination, rework, or missed communications. The ODT personnel validated the Case 0 model by comparing the SimVision schedule and manpower data against the SAIDT Project Schedule. Upon validation that the Case 0 model accurately represented their planned project, the ODT developed a more articulated and realistic baseline model (Case 1), which incorporated many more details on the actors (skill types and levels, full-time equivalents), tasks (communication and rework links between tasks), and project parameters (such as centralization, formalization, and team experience as well as information exchange and error probabilities).
The SAIDT Case 1 Simulation predicted the impact of rework and communication failure on several of the project's original performance objectives. It indicated that the project would likely miss its schedule completion date by two months and would require more total work days than forecast (see Table 4 ). From a quality standpoint, however, the results were satisfactory. The risk to quality from functional exceptions was 0.468, where 0.4 is significant but acceptable and represents problems that do not propagate, as they do not affect other tasks. The risk to quality arising from project exceptions was 0.251, an acceptable level of risk. The key result of this effort was the recognition that after adding in realistic project details beyond the critical path model, the simulation predicted that the SAIDT was unlikely to achieve their scheduled completion date.
From a macrocontingency theory perspective, the baseline SAIDT organization performs reasonably well (see Tables 1 and 2 ) based on the OrgCon analysis. From an information processing viewpoint, however, the baseline model is projected to miss the schedule goals by more than two months (see Table 2 ) based on the SimVision analysis. As the CAIB report (2003) points out, schedule pressures, resource constraints, and organizational Indirect work days: Time spent on rework, coordination, and wait time.
Functional risk index: Measures the risk to quality arising from functional exceptions-problems that affect only the task from which they arise.
Project risk index: Measures the risk to quality arising from project exceptions-problems that may have an effect on work in another task.
culture issues, such as barriers to effective communication and a lack of a functioning chain of command, were all factors in the shuttle disasters. Thus the ODT developed several alternative designs, seeking to reduce completion time while preserving quality standards and minimizing misfits.
Case 2: Add Personnel Performing Tasks on
the Critical Path The ODT wanted to understand the effect of adding personnel to perform tasks on the critical path. Intuitively, one might expect additional resources to improve the project completion time. However, many years of managerial practice in areas such as software engineering have shown that adding personnel to a late project may, in fact, cause the project to delay further (Brooks 1974) .
Adding personnel in the OrgCon model produced two misfits, one with the strategy and the other with the high degree of organizational complexity (see Table 2 ), indicating diminished fit between organizational, strategic, and environmental contingencies. The SimVision model showed mixed performance. Although Case 2 took less time to complete (427 days versus 442 for Case 1, the full baseline model), the schedule improvement came at the expense of additional work days (6,254 versus 5,899, see Table 4 ).
Case 3: Limit the Scope of Work
Because additional resources did not improve on the overall performance of the baseline case, the most obvious options were to delay the schedule or reduce the work volume. As other work flows are contingent upon the timely completion of the SAIDT work, the ODT next studied the effect of reducing the work volume by limiting the scope of one of the analysis cycles.
While the elimination of tasks has significant effects for the bottom-up, task-oriented SimVision analysis, it changes nothing for the top-down, organizational contingency theory-based OrgCon analysis. Thus, results for Case 3 were the same as the baseline model (see Table 2 ). The SimVision analysis shows that reducing the scope of work significantly improved the model (see Table 4 ), reducing the project duration (398 days) and total work involved (5,508 days), while maintaining acceptable levels of risk as measured by functional (0.466) and project (0.252) exceptions.
The results of Case 3 made a strong argument to limit the scope of work to meet schedule and budget goals. Again, the CAIB report on the Columbia disaster attributed the loss of the shuttle, in part, on pressures to meet schedule goals. The ODT wanted to avoid creating a similar situation by setting unrealistic schedule and budget goals. Given that Case 3 looked like a reasonable approach to setting up the SAIDT, the team next worked to refine this organization design.
Case 4: Case 3 with High Centralization
The SAIDT chairperson wanted to know what level of centralization made the most sense. Higher centralization provides more expert direction from project managers who can integrate the results of the projects, and use that information to inform their recommendations to higher management. On the other hand, high centralization also offers the prospect of information bottlenecks and delegation by default-when lower level engineers are forced to make their own decisions after waiting too long for direction from their managers (Kim and Burton 2002) .
The ODT developed Case 4 as a highly centralized organization with the same task structure as Case 3. In OrgCon, Case 4 shows the same contingency misfit as the baseline model-the developmental climate is misfit with the high degree of organizational complexity (see Table 2 ). A developmental climate should not be restricted by a rigid hierarchy and job specialization, so everyone can react quickly to new situations (Zammuto and Krakower 1991) . The developmental climate is also misfit with a high degree of centralization. A developmental climate requires a decentralized organization structure to be able to react quickly to new events and opportunities .
By using SimVision, Case 4 increased the project duration (to 410 days) and the total work days (to 5,640). As expected, functional exception quality improved (0.321), as subordinates were more likely to seek direction from their managers when encountering an exception (see Table 4 ). However, because the previous level of quality was acceptable, this does not represent a major improvement. In short, the change to a higher level of centralization resulted in an additional contingency misfit, projected problems meeting the schedule, and additional resources were required. Thus, Case 4 is not expected to be an improvement over Case 3; the best model examined to this point in the study.
Case 5: Case 3 with Low Centralization
The Case 5 analysis is the converse of Case 4. Because the increase in centralization diminished project team performance, the ODT next developed a highly decentralized model to determine if the opposite approach would improve project performance.
The OrgCon analysis produced a number of misfits related to the leadership style and organizational climate (see Table 2 ). Unlike the "entrepreneur" leadership style of the previous OrgCon models, the "leader" style of the decentralized model is associated with a high preference for delegation and a low level of detail in decision making. This style is a misfit with elements of NASA such as a high formalization, a functional configuration, and a machine bureaucracy as these organizational elements are too rigid and inflexible for the style of leader. The developmental climate is a dynamic and flexible organizational climate based on a high level of trust, and thus is a misfit with a functional configuration, high formalization, and high organizational complexity, as they tend to also be rigid and inflexible (Zammuto and Krakower 1991) .
The SimVision analysis shows that compared with Case 3, the highly decentralized Case 5 has a nearly identical duration (397 for Case 5 versus 398 for Case 3) and cost (5,458 days for Case 5 versus 5,508 for Case 3), but that quality is notably worse (see Table 4 ). The functional risk in particular (0.617 for Case 5 versus 0.466 for Case 3) is approaching dangerous levels (0.7 is considered very high and problematic). The OrgCon and SimVision cases together demonstrate that Case 5 does not improve likely project performance, and thus Case 3 is the best option considering project duration, cost, and quality together.
Case 6: What If SAIDT Had an Organization
Design Like Pre-2003 NASA? One of the major motivations for the new NASA organization design was to move away from a flawed previous model. The next analysis demonstrates the positive aspects of the ongoing change, i.e., that without the changes underway, the organization would face many more problems. This analysis employed OrgCon, because many of the relevant changes were in areas that OrgCon is better suited to address such as culture, leadership, structure, and strategy (see Table 1 for inputs to the OrgCon model).
Implementing the tasks of SAIDT with an organization based on the old NASA resulted in a large number of misfits (see Table 2 ). The CAIB report pointed out that NASA managers felt pressured to maintain a shortterm focus on schedule and budget at the expense of quality processes. This short time horizon approach conflicts with an analyzer with innovation strategy (Miles and Snow 1978) . This strategy, which requires flexibility to change, also conflicts with a group climate characterized by high resistance to change. In addition, a group climate with a high degree of trust, low conflict, and medium-to-high morale (among other factors) is a mismatch with leaders having a high preference for making decisions (Zammuto and Krakower 1991) .
Attempting to accomplish the SAIDT tasks with a pre-2003 NASA organization would also present several contingency misfits. First, managers with low preference for delegation and high uncertainty avoidance present a misfit with results-based incentives. This mismatch creates confusion and frustration for manager and employee alike (Miller and Toulouse 1986) . Second, the group climate would be incongruous with several organizational contingencies. The high-trust, low-conflict, high-morale, and high-leadership credibility of the group climate is a misfit with the separation of jobs into rigid specializations and a highly formalized structure (Zammuto and Krakower 1991) .
The analysis here clearly shows the potential benefits of the transformation underway at NASA. Current and future missions require the use of technical expertise distributed across the field centers. Yet, developing an organization design capable of integrating this expertise is challenged by the cultural imperatives and traditions that exist at each center (research versus manned space flight versus unmanned robotic space missions, etc.), the persistent center fiefdom mentality and rivalries, and the inherent slowness with which bureaucracy can be changed in any large organization. The SAIDT design attempts to operate more seamlessly in a One NASA mode: less intercenter competition, more cooperation, more use of modern information technology to operate in virtual teams, and more alignment across the centers and teams to get the institutional resources (staff, facilities, budgets, etc.) in line and executing toward the Presidential Vision for Space Exploration.
One-Year Retrospective: What Worked
and What Didn't 6.1. SAIDT Performance Project Constellation managers reviewed SAIDT performance one year later as part of planning for the next year's operations. This review revealed a number of positive outcomes, as well as ongoing challenges, related to the SAIDT organization design process. On the positive side, the SAIDT organization (shown in Figure 3 ) achieved a high degree of virtuality, or geographically distributed operations coordinated via electronic communications. By drawing on staff from seven NASA field centers, the SAIDT organization effectively matched the skills or disciplines required by the tasks with those possessed by NASA staff. The core leadership planning team used electronic communications to plan the studies, coordinate activities, and achieve team consensus whenever practical. This structure also proved to be flexible and able to take on unexpected work effectively.
The SAIDT leadership decided to reduce the number of planned analysis cycles, as recommended by Case 3 (reported in §5.4). This certainly helped, as planning the analysis study tasks to be performed during the first full cycle proved to be more challenging, and thus took longer than originally thought. The process of polling each of the 14 IDTs for their study task proposals, prioritizing them in light of programmatic requirements, documenting them into a written and approved study plan, finding and assigning task leads, and populating their study teams, proved to be challenging even with the experienced SAIDT leadership and virtual management tools discussed previously. The high degree of distributed matrix teaming in the overall IDT structure, together with this being the first time through the planning process in the new team structure, contributed to the longer planning period required.
Ongoing challenges remain as well. A key challenge in any matrix organization is maintaining open horizontal and vertical communication. The SAIDT experience during the first year of operations underscored this fact. There were instances of miscommunication within the SAIDT planning team that resulted in conflicting guidance being issued to lower tiers in the team. The geographically distributed nature of the personnel on the team was a contributing factor. It should be noted that this arrangement of chair and deputy coming from different centers was an intentional One NASA feature of the original IDT design. The SAIDT leaders resolved this issue by communicating more frequently, which also illustrates two key factors in the success of implementing any organization: individual commitment and action. These are critical to maintaining communication and information flow in geographically distributed organizations like the SAIDT.
Cultural Impact of Organization Design
Simulation Tools at NASA As mentioned above, the CAIB report that identified organizational and cultural factors as contributing causes to Columbia's loss provided motivation for the ODT's research into improved organization design and simulation methods. Early results from the ODT's work have been promising. First, the effort to apply DSM to design the IDT structure was honored with a One NASA Peer Award. The award citation read:
In recognition of your achievement in the demonstration of One NASA behaviors. You are being recognized by your peers for successfully creating the optimal Organization Science 17(2), pp. 202-214, © 2006 INFORMS Constellation Systems Integrated Discipline Team (IDT) structure by active engagement of all Centers, focusing on the common good of the Agency, and using innovative organizational design techniques.
Second, senior NASA managers requested that the ODT apply the techniques outlined in this paper in a followon study to simulate the entire Constellation System Engineering and Integration organization. Results of this larger scale simulation would then be used to refine the broader organization design to improve its performance in future government fiscal years.
To build on the success and management recognition of these initial studies, the ODT continues to look for Agency programs and projects in their formulation phase that can benefit from organization design and simulation. Knowledge capture and broader dissemination to customers and prospective users of the tools and methods is a necessary next step. Toward that end, the ODT formalized this activity into an initiative entitled POMS, which captures the knowledge developed over the past two years into a toolkit. The toolkit is a desktop software application being developed by the ODT to provide program and project managers, system engineers, and cost analysts with immediate access to the POMS tools, methods, case studies, and supporting databases through an intuitive graphic user interface.
However, the design of new organizations within NASA is still being performed by senior managers as a largely intuitive process informed primarily by past experience and often influenced by the external operating environment and interpersonal networks. Managers view design of their organizations as a responsibility and a right that comes with the job. The challenge for the ODT is to continue the process of institutionalizing the POMS design approach, so that more managers are aware of these tools and methods. The goal is not to replace intuitive and experiential-based organization design, but to use it as a starting point for subsequent, analysis-based assessments of the candidate designs, the results of which can either validate the manager's intuition or provide a counterintuitive result that merits closer examination.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper reports on the process of designing a new organization unit within NASA. The NASA design challenge is to obtain a good or satisficing (Simon 1955) design, where coordination among the distributed units in a large organization is paramount to meet the requirements of time within the available resources and at acceptable quality levels. The new organization must also fit within an ongoing, agencywide transformation in operations and organizational culture, while achieving the integration of complex space and ground systems into the entire Constellation System. Several themes emerge from this effort.
The Context Matters
One theme that emerges is that organization designs are shaped by the constraints of the larger organization and the organizational environment (Pettigrew 1987, Galunic and Eisenhardt 1994) . For example, the transformation underway at NASA seeks to change a bureaucracy, a culture, and traditions that formed over many years. Changing such an organization is also a long-term project. The SAIDT design team received support from senior managers in pushing the boundaries of typical NASA organizational approaches to operate with more cooperation and less competition, using information technology tools to operate an effective virtual team. This support may not have been as pronounced had the larger organization change effort been absent.
In addition, the SAIDT design is constrained by the technology. Human space exploration requires the development of a large number of high reliability, interactive systems, many of them novel. This work, in turn, requires personnel distributed across many geographically dispersed centers to integrate their work. Thus, simple designs with low coordination would not be likely to accomplish the required tasks.
The organization design simulation tools we used fit both the problem and the NASA culture. Because NASA relies heavily on simulations in the engineering of complex technical systems, tools that simulate the human systems fit the engineering culture that pervades the organization. Because the process and tools were acceptable to NASA personnel, the result or outcomes were more likely to be accepted as well, contingent upon customary verification and validation of the tools' underlying algorithms and assumptions. DSM, OrgCon, and SimVision modeling processes all rely heavily on team member input. This has two advantages: (1) that the models are informed by the subject matter experts and (2) the models promote "buy-in" and acceptance of the results. The tools also provide a "technical grammar" (Argyres 1999) , which helps the design team generate and evaluate possibilities.
This implies that much like the contingent relationships between the environment and aspects of the organization design, there may be a contingent relationship between the tools employed for organization design and the organization itself. This is not an area that the academic organization design literature has focused on.
The Tools Matter
Organization design is fundamentally an experiencebased process performed intuitively by leaders and managers ). Managerial intuition is likely to be sufficient in situations where there are few variables with less interaction than the situation described here. The complexity of the NASA challenge argues for a set of tools and processes that complement managerial intuition.
The tools and processes employed here clarified key issues and questions, challenged assumptions, shaped the generation of alternatives, and provided a common framework for consideration of alternatives. For example, the DSM methodology focuses on the relationships between project components to facilitate the design of a modular system architecture or organization structure. OrgCon focuses on the overall fit between organizational components and environmental factors, including the organization's strategy and its environment. Finally, SimVision provides a detailed, information-processingbased view of tasks, processes, and people that allows managers to focus on the effect of "hidden" work such as rework, coordination, and wait time on project performance.
Organization Design Process Implications for
Contingency Theory The SAIDT design team eliminated misfits as they iteratively improved the organization design to a satisficing conclusion. The first phase of the project used the DSM to avoid misfits by grouping interdependent project elements together to create 14 integrated discipline teams that cut across NASA centers, projects, and functional areas. The creation of groups with higher degrees of external interactions compared to internal interactions would have been a misfit (Simon 1962) . The second phase developed the structural properties of the SAIDT, in particular, using OrgCon to assess whether any misfits existed between characteristics of the organization and its environment. Finally, the ODT used SimVision in the third phase as a means to develop the microlevel, task-oriented SAIDT design. The misfits of the baseline model (the likelihood that the project would not meet schedule and budget constraints) generated the search for alternative organizational models. Thus the design team concentrated on the alleviation of misfits, rather than the search for fit.
Yet, organizational contingency theory is more often presented as a theory of fit, typically between environmental factors and organization design elements. A contingency fit is defined as a match "between the organization structure and contingency factors that has a positive effect on performance" (Donaldson 2001, p. 7) , "while a misfit produces a negative effect on organizational performance" (p. 15), where the misalignment between organizational and environmental factors leads to diminished performance (Naman and Slevin 1993, Donaldson 2001 ). However, misfits are "less well developed in terms of operational statements and empirical tests" (Burton et al. , p. 1480 .
Thus, one conclusion from this perspective is that theory, which is articulated in terms of misfits speaks more directly to managers than theory, which is stated in fit terms. Managers can use misfits as a mechanism in the design process. In short, misfits provide the bridge between practice and theory.
A second implication for theory is that organizational contingency theory is not completely developed and tested as a misfit theory ; there is much to do here. Misfit concepts are complementary to fit arguments, but that does not mean it is a simple task of restatement. Given the number of organizational and environmental elements, there are a vast number of potential dyadic interactions, and thus a vast number of potential misfits. However misfits are not likely to all be of the same importance, either in practice (for example, some were ignored by the design team) or in theory, where some misfits are likely to have greater effect on performance than others. That is, there is a degree of performance loss, which varies across the misfits that needs to be developed and understood.
Limitations and Directions for Future
Research This study is limited in its focus. These limitations, however, help point the way for future work. First, this study examines the work of a single organizational design team. Much of the detail work was focused on the development of the Constellation SAIDT, in particular. Thus the description here concerns the issues encountered, as well as the tools and approaches used in this one case. The current pilot program was intended as a proof of concept for NASA, and it is being extended there. Nonetheless, the processes and tools are specific.
Second, the single case raises issues of generalizability and transferability. NASA is a complex peculiar organization. Few organizations match it. Yet, it contains elements familiar to many organizations-the need to match strategy, structure, and processes, the challenge of coordinating the work of geographically distributed experts, and the limitations of organizational context. Thus it provides a worthwhile test bed to examine how fit is achieved in the face of constraints (Siggelkow 2001) .
Finally, we believe that the organization design case study detailed here may be viewed as an iterative process of misfit identification and elimination. Our theories are often not operationalized or tested with a focus on misfits. Doing so in the future will more directly address managerial needs and fit the processes they employ.
